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Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
[U.C.I.T.A.]: The Consumer's Perspective
David A. Szwak"
I. INTRODUCTION
While many groups express outrage at the substance of
U.C.I.T.A.,' the most significant group to feel its adverse effects is
the collective consumer population. U.C.I.T.A. was originally
drafted in anticipation of becoming Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code. For that to happen required the approval of the
final text by the American Law Institute (ALI). However, the ALI
refused to approve U.C.I.T.A. thereby preventing U.C.I.T.A. from
becoming part of the Uniform Commercial Code.2 Following
ALI's refusal to approve U.C.I.T.A., the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) decided to forge
ahead, attempting to gain passage on a state-by-state basis.3
There has been strong opposition to U.C.I.T.A. from its
inception.4 One-half of the states' attorneys generals signed a petition
Copyright 2002, by LouIsLANA LAW REVIEW.
* David A. Szwak is an attorney and partner with the Shreveport, Louisiana
based law firm of Bodenheimer, Jones, Szwak & Winchell, LLP. He is a member
of the Louisiana State Law Institute panel commissioned to study U.C.I.T.A. Mr.
Szwak is a 1991 graduate of Paul M. Hebert Law Center, LSU. He has authored
three prior law review articles, two of which appear in Louisiana Law Review
volumes and the third in The John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information
Law, The John Marshall Law School.
1. U.C.I.T.A. is an acronym for Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.hn#ucita (last visited Feb.
24, 2003).
2. Jean Braucher, Why UCITA, Like UC.C. Article 2B, Is Premature and
Unsound, available at http://www.2bguide.com/docs/0499jb.html (last visited Feb.
24,2003); Robert Oakley, UCITA: The Uniforn Computer Information Transactions
Act: An Update, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Research
Libraries (Oct. 13, 1999) available at http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/oakley.htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
3. Article 2B Effort Divorced From U.C.C., Groups Agree to Repackage,
Change Name, 4 Electronic Com. L. Rep. (BNA) (4/14/99).
4. See, e.g., California Consumer Protection Foundation, at http:
//www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/econmerce/ucita/index.shtml (last visited Feb.
24,2003); Americans For Fair Electronic Commerce at http://www.4cite.org/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2003); American Libraries Association at
http://www.ala.org/washoff/ucita/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2003); Association of
Research Libraries at http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/ucitapg.hnl (last visited
Feb. 24, 2003); Institute of Electrical and Electrical Engineers (IEEE) at
http://www.ieeeusa.org/forum/issues/JCITA/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2003); Letter from Steve Brobeck, Consumer Federation of America, Todd Paglia,
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opposing U.C.I.T.A.' The Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of
Consumer Protection has openly opposed U.C.I.T.A as it violates
multiple F.T.C. regulations that protect consumers. It is widely
acknowledged that U.C.I.T.A. authorizes adhesive contracts. 7 With
all this opposition, one must wonder who supports U.C.I.T.A.? The
three principal U.C.I.T.A. lobby groups are Digital Commerce
Coalition (DCC), Information Technology Association of America
(ITAA), and Business Software Coalition (BSC).8 The list of
members funding these lobby groups reads like a "who's who" of the
software and online community.' Each of these entities stands to
profit greatly if U.C.I.T.A. becomes law.
The potential harm that U.C.I.T.A. stands to cause the average
American consumer far exceeds its impact on commercial groups. As
currently written, U.C.I.T.A. must be fought, adopting a "bomb
shelter'' oprovision, if necessary, to prevent implementation of
Consumer Project on Technology, Linda Golodner, National Consumers League
and Edmund Mierzwinski, U.S. Public Interest Research Group to Charles Wright,
President of American Law Institute (Nov. 10, 1998) available at http:
//www.cptech.org/ucc/sign-on.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003); Jean Braucher,
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA): Objections From the
Consumer Perspective, paper submitted to the Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 11,
2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/warranty
/comments/braucherjean.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter "Braucher,
Objections"].
5. Uniform Acts on Electronic Signatures, Software Transactions Finalized
ByNCCUSL, 4 Electronic Com. L. Rep. (BNA) 673 (8/4/99). See also Letter from
attorneys opposing U.C.I.T.A. to Gene Lebrun, President of National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 23, 1999), available at
http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/agoppltr.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
6. Letter from Federal Trace Commission to John L. McClaugherty, Chair,
Executive Committee of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (July 9, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2003).
7. Braucher, Objections, supra note 4.
8. Additional information concerning these groups is available at their
respective websites. See Digital Commerce Commission at http://www.ucitayes.org/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2003); Information Technology Association of America at
http://www.itaa.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2003); and Business Software Alliance at
http://www.bsa.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
9. BSC members include: Apple, Autodesk, CNC Software, Corel, IBM, Intel,
Intuit, Macromedia, Network Associates, Novell, Sybase and Semantec. DCC
members include: America Online, Adobe Systems, American Stock Exchange,
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Compaq, Daimler Chrysler, Dun & Bradstreet,
Lotus, IBM, Microsoft, NASDAQ, New York Mercantile Exchange, New York
Stock Exchange, and Novell. Microsoft lobbyists are reportedly leading and
directing the efforts on the national and state-wide levels. See also Americans for
Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions athttp://www.affect.ucita.com/ (last visited
Feb. 24, 2003).
10. A bomb shelter provision is anti-U.C.I.T.A. legislation designed to protect
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U.C.I.T.A. in Louisiana. Other states are effectively enacting such
"bomb shelter" provisions to prevent U.C.I.T.A. from becoming law
in those jurisdictions. Following is a discussion of some of the
more offensive aspects of U.C.I.T.A. and their implications for
Louisiana consumers.
II. POST-SALE DISCLOSURE OF TERMS
U.C.I.T.A. was designed to validate post-payment and post-sale
disclosure of terms." In Louisiana, a sale is perfected by an
agreement or "meeting of the minds" as to a lawful object, "cause,"
consent and the parties' capacity to contract. 2 U.C.I.T.A.
effectively defeats the "consent" of the parties by permitting the
vendor to impose additional terms on the consumer after the sale is
completed and payment made. 3 The post transaction imposition of
additional terms, such as arbitration, choice of law, choice of forum,
consent to personal jurisdiction for example, is an unsavory
business practice and subject to widespread abuse. None of these
terms need appear in the advertisement, on the package, or on the
web page from which a sale is transacted. Under Louisiana law,
this practice might be construed as a counter-offer or an
impermissible attempt to add conditions after the sale.'4 Failure to
state residents from certain licensing provisions that are possible in U.C.I.T.A.-
governed contracts, particularly in click-wrap and shrink-wrap licenses found in
mass-market products where the parties have not negotiated. Some of these bomb
shelter laws protect licensees from choice of law provisions that attempt to make
U.C.I.T.A. the law governing the contract. Other bomb shelter laws protect
consumers from choice of forum provisions. See Iowa legislative activity report,
available at http://www.ala.org/washoff/ucita/iowa.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003)
and Ed Foster, UCITA Running on Empty, InfoWorld, available at
http://archive.infoworld.com/articles/op/xml/01/07/02/0 lO702opfoster.xml (last
visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter "Foster, UCITA"].
11. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 2527 (1987);
Mehler v. Terminix Int'l Co., 205 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) and Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17,24 (2d Cir. 2002). These decisions
and many others confirm that state law governs issues of contract formation in the
absence of preemption by federal law.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 2439. See also Marcantel v. Jefferson Door Co., 817 So.
2d 236 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2002) and Phillips v. Berner, 789 So. 2d 41,45 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied 798 So. 2d 119, reconsideration denied 801 So. 2d 1066 (La.
2001).
13. U.C.I.T.A. §§ 201-209 (2000).
14. La. Civ. Code art. 2601. See also La. Comm'l Bank v. Georgia Int'l Life
Ins. Co., 618 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993); Foster v. Tullos, 341 So. 2d 85
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 383
So. 2d 1040 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Parviz Owsia, The Notation and Function of
Offer and Acceptance Under French and English Law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 871 (1992).
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disclose such proposed terms in advance precludes the transaction
being a conditional sale. 5
Post-payment and post-sale addition of terms will hinder the
development of electronic commerce in Louisiana.16 In this age of
growth in online activity and where the benefits of online commerce
are being realized, it is important to resist attempts by special
interests, like the software' manufacturing industry, to introduce laws
which do more to harm commerce than they do to promote
commerce. U.C.I.T.A. effectively prevents comparative shopping
because the consumer is unaware of the seller's terms until after the
transaction is completed. Comparative shopping is one of the
strongest benefits afforded by online shopping. A consumer should
be able to easily and quickly visit competing sites and decide, based
upon the disclosures, which product they want and what terms apply.
Louisiana law has never permitted post-sale terms to be added, a
practice that is particularly offensive in the consumer setting.
Other post-sale and post-payment disclosures such as limitation
of warranty, disclaimers, transfer restrictions and comment and
criticism restrictions are also built into these add-on terms.' License
provisions frequently limit the number of users and the length of time
that the product may be used. It is easy to understand why the
software industry seeks to hide these post-sale and post-payment
provisions in convenient shrink-wrap 9 and click-wrap2° packages. It
15. Louisiana law does not even recognize "conditional sales," which is a
common law concept. See Assocs. Discount Corp. v. Bogard, 86 So. 2d 76, 78 (La.
1956); Hewitt v. Safeway Ins. Co., 787 So. 2d 1182, 1186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2001);
Haymon v. Holliday, 405 So. 2d 1304, 1307 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981). Louisiana's
only exception pertains to immovable "Bond for Deed" sales. La. R.S. 9:2941
(1997). See also Montz v. Theard, 818 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002).
16. A thorough discussion of electronic contracting issues can be found in
Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues, 14 J. Marshal J. of
Computer and Info. L. 211 (1996).
17. "Software" exists in many forms and is not always a complex program
incorporated in an item traditionally thought of as a computer-type product.
Software exists in all programmable electronic devices, capable of storing,
retrieving, accessing, updating, combining, rearranging, printing, reading,
processing or otherwise altering information whether such information is
maintained in that device or at some other remote and accessible location.
"Software" would generally include the entire set of computer programs,
procedures, documentation, or other recorded instructions which guide a device or
human in the operation of the device.
18. PC Magazine tested database software produced by Oracle. But because
of license provisions restricting comment and critiscism, PC Magazine did not
publish the article containg their test results because they did not want to risk a
breach of license lawsuit. The Test That Wasn't, PC Magazine, Aug. 1999, at 29.
19. Mass marketed software is usually accompanied by a license agreement
inside the shrink-wrapped package. The license is not signed by the consumer-user.
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is very likely that such onerous conditions would be a factor in the
decision to buy if they were made pre-sale or pre-payment.
The post-sale and post-payment imposition of "criticism and
comparison" restrictions prevents trade journalists from publishing
objective reviews of products and their licenses, and limits their
ability to compare competing products and present criticism or
commentary on competitive vendors and their products to potential
consumers. This is particularly important when new software or
products with embedded software are first introduced into the market.
The non-criticism term restricts the free exchange of information
about products and limits the ability of consumers to make informed
decisions about competing goods.
III. MOUSE CLICK CONSENT
U.C.I.T.A. validates buyer consent manifested by mouse-click
alone. This form of "fictional assent" assumes capacity and the
identity of the buyer. Consumers often purchase products with
software previously installed. For example, automobiles, computers,
televisions, cameras, security systems and many other common
products are all affected by this fictional assent. The product
assembler, software installer and secondary programmers are not
capable of providing consent to contract terms on behalf of a
subsequent third party buyer of the finished product. Again, these
post-sale and post-payment terms are not even known by the
consumer (purchaser). In their ordinary process, the assemblers,
installer and programmers prepare the product for consumer-friendly
Often these terms are shipped with the product after the purchase and payment have
been made. Shrink-wrapped licensing information, either on paper or recorded on
software media, get its name from the fact that retail software packages are often
covered in plastic or cellophane shrink-wrap and these packages contain licenses,
not previously seen by the consumer, that purport to take effect as soon as the
customer removes the shrink-wrap from the package. Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 n.6 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing ProCD v. Ziedenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996)).
20. "Click-wrap" refers to software and other online windows which display a
license agreement and request the consumer's assent by clicking the mouse on an
"I agree" or similar box. See Specht v. Netscape Communications, 150 F. Supp. 2d
585, 593-95 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) aff'd, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Real
Networks, Inc. Privacy Litigation, No. 00-C-1366, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2000); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C98-20064
JW, 1998 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 10729, 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16,1998).
"Click wrap" terms are non-negotiated terms but usually not concealed prior to use.
Nonetheless, the terms are forced upon the consumer post-sale, post-payment and
post-download/post-installation. Thus, once in place, how can the consumer
realistically say "no." Compare "click-wrap" with "browse-wrap" which is
discussed in Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
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use. These workers are employed by the intermediate manufacturer
and retail vendors. Occasionally they are employed or contracted by
the end user or consumer. In either case, the end user is not aware of
the restrictions assented to by the various intermediaries.
Worse yet, U.C.I.T.A. allows the software manufacturer to define
conduct as assent for future transactions. For example, a term might
provide that assent by mouse-click upon setting up your computer at
home would provide assent to the terms of any future updated or
revised versions of the software which might be provided later. That
software license might impose even more and, surely, creative terms
generally favoring the software manufacturer. U.C.I.T.A. does not
even require that the new terms and conditions be reasonable.
Further, U.C.I.T.A. does not require that the consumer or other
purchaser reasonably expect the addition of new terms and
conditions.
IV. PRECLUSION OF CONSUMER LAW BENEFITS
There is some doubt about whether U.C.I.T.A. will prevent courts
from applying consumer protection laws. Proponents of U.C.I.T.A.
argue that software transactions normally covered by goods-related
consumer protection laws would lose that protection. U.C.I.T.A.
classifies consumer software contracts as a license of computer
information, not the sale of goods." Prior to the introduction of
U.C.I.T.A., American courts treated software transactions with
consumers to be sales of goods, not a license or sale of services.22 It
is easy to understand that consumers consider the purchase of
software to be that of a product or "good," and not a license.23
21. Computer information transactions are defined to be agreements "to create,
modify, transfer or license computer information or informational rights in
computer information." U.C.I.T.A. §§ 102(11), 103 (2000).
22. Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38
Duq. L. Rev. 459 (2000), draftpublishied in PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks
& Literary Property Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. GO-00J9, (Feb.-Mar.,
2001) (Analysis of trend in case law away from application of U.C.C. provisions to
software sales and licensing and toward application of intellectual property
principles); Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrink Wrap Licenses, 68
S.Cal. L. Rev. 1239 (1995).
23. A "license" is generally considered to be a personal privilege to do some
particular act or series of acts and is ordinarily revocable at the will of the licensor
and is not assignable. A license is a transfer of rights less than the full patent.
Black's Law Dictionary 919-20 (6th ed. 1999). U.C.I.T.A. defines "license" as;
a contract that authorizes access to, use of, distribution, display,
performance, modification, or reproduction of information, or use
of informational rights, and expressly limits the contractual rights,
permissions, or uses granted, expressly prohibits some uses, or
expressly grants less than all rights in the information. A contract
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U.C.I.T.A. conflicts with the existing legal framework governing
software sales. It will affect the scope of consumer protection laws
that have not been amended to harmonize with U.C.I.T.A.'s new
"vendor friendly" provisions. Will laws like the federal Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, which incorporates state law features, apply now
to software transactions? Will deceptive trade practice statutes apply
to these transactions? Will federal and state anti-deception statutes
apply? Clearly, U.C.I.T.A. promotes deferring disclosure of terms
until after the sale transaction is nominally complete. U.C.I.T.A. thus
favors the software industry with a unique set of rules regarding
contract formation. Other industries, especially in consumer sales,
are required to provide early notice of key terms and conditions.
These terms and conditions are to be prominently displayed and
brought to the consumer's attention. 4 Further, in some cases, special
language and presentation are to be employed so as to assure that the
consumer makes a well-informed and educated decision about the
potential purchase. Consumer protection laws promote meaningful and
informed consumer choice. These laws should ensure that efficiency
and fairness prevail in the marketplace for all products, including
software.
V. U.C.I.T.A.'s OPT-IN WILL PROTECT THOSE IN THE
MANUFACTURER-ASSEMBLER-VENDOR CHAIN
Another protective measure for vendors in U.C.I.T.A. is the "opt-
in" provision. Any of the parties in the manufacturing, assembling and
vending chain may opt-in and receive the protections of U.C.I.T.A. If
software is included in the sale (or license transfer) and if the software
is a material" part of the transaction, then the parties in the
may be a license whether or not the transferee has title to a
licensed copy. The term includes an access contract and a
consignment of a copy. The term does not include a reservation
or creation of a security interest.
U.C.I.T.A. § 102(42) (2000).
24. See e.g. FDA, DHHS Labeling, 21 C.F.R. § 801.430(d) (2002) (Consumer
product information must be displayed prominently and legibly and in easily
understood language); Consumer Credit Protection, 15 U. S.C. § § 1601-67, (2001)
(TILA mandates clear and conspicuous display of consumer purchase and finance
related information); FTC Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16
C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3, (2002) (FTC holder rule notices on each consumer credit
contract); 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994) (Reaffirmation agreement notices); U.C.C. §
2-316(2) (2000) (Any exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of
merchantability); and 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1997) (FCRA requires special notices).
25. Material is defined by U.C.I.T.A. as "meaning anything more than a trivial
element of the product or transaction." U.C.I.T.A. § 104 (2000). Thus, it is
conceivable that any use of software would be "material" and would invoke
U.C.I.T.A.'s opt-in and protections against the consumer. U.C.I.T.A. § 104 cmt.
2002]
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manufacturer-assembler-vendor chain may opt-in and gain all of the
protections afforded by U.C.I.T.A. In light of the pervasive use of
software in consumer products, U.C.I.T.A. will apply to most consumer
products. Manufacturers will thus have an incentive to incorporate
superfluous software components for the sole purpose of gaining the
protections of U.C.I.T.A.
Even without the opt-in provision, consumer financed purchases of
software and software operated products involve consumer credit
contracts. These contracts are bound to incorporate the FTC Holder
Rule notice, required by 16 C.F.R. 433, et. seq. The FTC Holder Rule
notice generally provides the consumer with "all claims or defenses"
against the assignee which the consumer might have against the
original vendor up to the cap provided by the statute.2 6 If the vendor is
protected by U.C.I.T.A., then arguably that protection is passed along
to the assignee of the credit contract thereby negating consumer rights
against the holder (assignee) of the consumer credit contract.
VI. BROAD TRANSFER AND ACQUISITION RESTRICTIONS
Broad transfer and acquisition restrictions are crafted into
U.C.I.T.A. to inhibit competition between new and used products and
prevent a secondary market for the software goods.27 In a mass market
setting, consumers expect perfect freedom to sell, transfer, acquire,
donate or otherwise dispose of their property that might happen to
contain software components, such as cars, computers, cameras, and
video games. One must consider the implications of these transfer and
acquisition restrictions in a realistic context. If a consumer owns a
computer with one or more software systems, including the base
operating system," the broad transfer and acquisition restrictions
applicable to those software components will prevent the lawful
transfer and acquisition of the computer unless the disposing consumer
removes the software or acquires additional rights from the licensor.
Legally, any transferee of the used system would be expected to pay for
an additional license in order to operate the system under U.C.I.T.A.
Conversely, if the disposing consumer were to remove the base
operating system before transfer, it would generally render the
computer useless. In fact, some computer hardware manufacturers
build their physical components to require particular software in order
2 (2000).
26. FTC Holder Rule, 16 C.F.R.§ 433.1 (2002). See, e.g., Simpson v. Anthony
Auto Sales, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 405 (W.D. La. 1998) and Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Morgan, 536 N.E.2d 587, 589-90 (Mass. 1989).
27. U.C.I.T.A. §§ 501-506 (2000).




to function at all.29 In this scenario a lawful secondary or used market
could not exist at all. One must also consider the fact that "hardware"
may be deemed to be "software" as contemplated by U.C.I.T.A. when
that hardware contains programming logic permanently stored in
components of the device. If so, then transfer or acquisition of the
computer without software becomes impossible and would be restricted
by U.C.I.T.A.3 ° Realistically, consumers would likely ignore such an
illogical and unreasonable law. Thus, enforcement of the law would
necessarily be selective.
Transfer and acquisition restrictions are usually vague and overly
broad. In addition to being forced upon the consumer in post-sale and
post-payment disclosures, these restrictions, set out in a license, prevent
competition between new and used products, causing increased costs
and reduced availability of products to the consumer. A healthy
competitive market for new and used products would reduce prices and
improve the quality of products available to the consumer.
VII. CHOICE OF LAW, CHOICE OF FORUM, AND ARBITRATION
PROVISIONS
U.C.I.T.A. authorizes the use of very flexible (from a vendor
perspective) choice of law, choice of forum,3 1 and arbitration clauses to
the disadvantage of the consumer.32 Again, in a mass market setting,
U.C.I.T.A. permits a person or entity in the manufacturer-assembler-
vendor chain to bring an action to enforce a license provision in any
United States forum?3 Those in the manufacturer-assembler-vendor
chain would be able to select the application of a law favorable to their
29. Some examples include video drivers, print drivers, camera drivers, scanner
drivers, audio drivers, and networking or connectivity drivers.
30. U.C.I.T.A. does not define "hardware." "Software" is defined broadly to
include the computer program, informational content contained in the program, and
any supporting information provided by the licensor. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(64) (2000).
"Computer program" is defined in terms of directing a computer to bring about a
certain result. U.C.I.T.A. § 102(13) (2000). U.C.I.T.A. also defines "computer"
broadly as an "electronic device that can perform substantial computations,...
without human intervention during the computation or operation." U.C.I.T.A. §
102(10) (2000).
31. U.C.I.T.A. provides that forum selection clauses are to be enforced unless
it is unreasonable or unjust. U.C.I.T.A. § 110(a) (2000). Forum selection clauses
are considered material terms to a contract. Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of
Ga., Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 621 n.13 (1 1th Cir. 2001); CECG, Inc. v. Magic Software
Enter., Inc., No. 02-1036, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141 (3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2002)
(forum selection clause upheld in software contract case); Billings v. Clinitec Int'l,
Inc., No. 00-1236-JTM, 2000 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 10904 (D. Kan. July 25, 2000).
32. U.C.I.T.A. § 109(a) (2000) (choice of law provisions).
33. Possibly also in a foreign jurisdiction and forum.
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view of the legal issues presented. Choice of law provisions stipulate
a legal regime favorable to the drafter of the contract, which is always
the manufacturer-assembler-vendor and not the consumer. 4 When
coupled with similarly biased terms, like mandated and binding
arbitration, the consumer is left with little power or ability to litigate or
contest the practices of parties in the manufacturer-assembler-vendor
chain or any other aspect of the product. Arbitration has come under
repeated attack as a biased and one-sided process favoring the
manufacturer-assembler-vendor. Arbitration clauses usually name a
particular arbitrator, who benefits from that contractual mandate of the
manufacturer-assembler-vendor. Would a rational manufacturer-
assembler-vendor name an arbitrator in their contracts if that arbitrator
tended to rule against the manufacturer-assembler-vendor? These
clauses also usually call for the consumer to pay for at least half of the
arbitration costs. It is highly unlikely that the typical consumer would
willingly incur such a high cost to pursue a grievance against a vendor
protected by U.C.I.T.A. In practical terms, by assenting to binding
arbitration, the consumer generally loses access to the courts in seeking
a fair resolution of any dispute with a U.C.I.T.A. protected vendor.
VIII. U.C.I.T.A. WEAKENS ARTICLE 2 STANDARD FOR WARRANTY
BY DEMONSTRATION
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides for a warranty
by demonstration standard and establishes a framework for commercial
transactions, involving the sale of goods.35 U.C.I.T.A. weakens the
Uniform Commercial Code provisions by establishing that software
products delivered to the consumer-purchaser need not match a
demonstration.36
U.C.I.T.A. offers the consumer no more than an "AS IS"
warranty. Software publishers may sell the software with warranty
restrictions and limitations allowed by U.C.I.T.A. and the consumer
34. Even if the license terms do not contain a choice of law provision,
U.C.I.T.A. provides a set of rules to establish a choice of law favoring the
manufacturer-assembler-vendor. If no choice of law provision is stated, then: (1)
if the contract involves providing access or electronic delivery of a copy then the
law of the jurisdiction where the licensor was located when the agreement was
entered into; (2) if the consumer contract provides for delivery of a tangible copy
then the law of the jurisdiction where the copy is or should be delivered to the
consumer will be used; (3) in any other cases, then the law of the jurisdiction with
the most significant relationship to the transaction governs. U.C.I.T.A. § 109(b)
(2000).
35. U.C.I.T.A. § 400 (2000).
36. U.C.I.T.A. § 402(a)(3) (2000). See also NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech.
Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Okla. 1997).
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is left with essentially no warranty." U.C.I.T.A. promotes a "Buyer
Beware" theme which is harmful to consumer confidence and trust.
Used car sales involve a similar lack of warranty protection, but have
given rise to legislation and case law affording consumers rights
against "lemons" which inevitably turn up in the marketplace."
IX. U.C.I.T.A. DOES NOT INVALIDATE PUBLIC CRITICISM
RESTRICTIONS
One particularly offensive provision incorporated into shrink-
wrap, click-wrap, and other similar software sales agreements is the
condition that the consumer-user not disclose the functions and
operation of the software and not publicly criticize the software.
Public comment and discussion on product quality are essential to
an efficient and free marketplace. U.C.I.T.A. permits comment and
criticism restrictions that may well infringe important First
Amendment rights of free speech. No body of codified contract law
currently addresses cases where contractual provisions seek to
prevent a buyer from commenting about the quality of the product
purchased. It is assumed under the U.C.C. that such cases will be
fact specific and that courts would invalidate terms found to violate
public policy. Proponents of U.C.I.T.A argue that contractual
provisions to limit comment are proper. Citing the laws governing
trade secrets, trademark, and unfair competition, U.C.I.T.A
proponents seek to extend this prohibition to end user licensees.
Such a step is unprecedented. It appears that U.C.I.T.A
proponents have attempted to wear down the public criticism
provision. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) appear to agree with the A.B.A.
working group on U.C.I.T.A that the public criticism provision
must declare unenforceable a license term prohibiting public
discussion about quality or performance when "any computer
information . . . is placed generally into the stream of
commerce."39
Other provisions found in U.C.I.T.A. seem to promote the use
of onerous, unexpected and non-disclosed terms favoring the
software manufacturer-assembler-vendor over the consumer.
Consumers have reason to fear that U.C.I.T.A. impliedly promotes
37. U.C.I.T.A. § 406 (Disclaimer or Modification of Warranty).
38. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12
(2001); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 198-b (1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:12-29 (West
2001); La. R.S. 51:1941 (1987).
39. Pike & Fisher's intemet.regulation.alert, Vol. 4, 8, 9 (Jun. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.pf.com/pdf/ira.pdf.
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manufacturers-assemblers-vendors. Even if the courts eventually find
these provisions to be contra bonos mores and illegal, it will take
years of continued litigation and millions of dollars in litigation costs
to resolve the issues. In the meantime, such provisions would create
a serious chilling effect on consumers and their willingness to discuss
product defects and malfunction. Many software licenses now
contain provisions prohibiting publication of articles critical of the
purchased product or any aspect of its function and use. Media
commentators are likely to avoid the risk of a lawsuit in lieu of the
marginal benefit in publishing such articles. It is dubious public
policy to prevent the sharing of product information, especially
critical commentary and studies.
X. LIBRARY RESTRICTIONS
The public good generated by America's library system cannot be
overstated. U.C.I.T.A. provides for transfer and acquisition
restrictions on mass market software and information products that
would seriously undermine the ability of our libraries to provide
information product access to their patrons.' These restrictions
would cause libraries to incur great expense in legally allowing
public access to such products. Libraries would be forced to either
seek additional public or private funding or pass the expenses on to
the consumer-patron. The latter option would likely reduce the
benefit and utility of the library system. It would surely increase the
technology gap between the wealthy and poor. Libraries frequently
supply the only access to technological advances for America's less
privileged and poor. U.C.I.T.A proponents, in an effort to quiet some
of the opposition, have agreed to make some library exceptions to
U.C.I.T.A. These concessions have not appeased the librarians who
continue to oppose U.C.I.T.A.
XI. PERMITS EXCLUSION OF INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides key benefits
to the consumer in the form of the doctrine of failure of essential
40. Letter from Association for Research Libraries to National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (July 12, 1999), available at
http://www.ala.org/washoff/ucita/letter.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003); Vicki L.
Gregory, OnLine, UCITA: What Does lt Meanfor Libraries? (Jan. 2001) available




purpose of a limited remedy." However, U.C.I.T.A. seeks to
preclude the benefits of that doctrine by allowing standardized terms
which preserve the exclusion of incidental and consequential
damages. U.C.I.T.A. goes further to enforce the exclusion of
incidental and consequential damages even when an agreed exclusive
remedy fails or would be unconscionable.42
XII. U.C.I.T.A. DOES NOT REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF KNOWN
DEFECTS
Software testing and customer feedback are important sources of
information about product defects. Under U.C.I.T.A., software
manufacturers-assemblers-vendors are not required to disclose
product defects to buyers. This lack of protection will lead to a lack
of necessary recalls and corrective measures. Concealment of known
defects simply compounds the ill effects of U.C.I.T.A.'s strong
support for warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations.
XIII. EMBEDDED SOFTWARE BoMBs ARE APPROVED BY
U.C.I.T.A.
Self help provisions are found in U.C.I.T.A.43 Software
manufacturers are embedding "logic bomb," self-help programs"
within their software to control the use of the software post-sale, to
prevent license violations, and to insure payment terms are met.45 By
labeling the sale of software as a "license," software manufacturers
41. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1989). See also Howard Foss, When to Apply the
Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purpose to an Exclusion of Consequential
Damages- An Objective Approach, 25 Duq. L. Rev. 551 (1987); J.A. Eddy, On the
"Essential" Purposes ofLimited Remedies: The Metaphysics of U C. C. Section 2-
719(2), 65 Cal. L. Rev. 28 (1977); Art Press, Ltd. v. Western Printing Machinery
Co., 852 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1988); Mart Enter., Inc. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556
F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1977); Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d
1002 (7th Cir. 1996); McKeman v. United Tech. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 60 (D. Conn.
1989).
42. U.C.I.T.A. § 803(c),(d) (2000).
43. U.C.I.T.A. § 815 (2000).
44. Security flaws purposefully designed into the software which permit back
door entry by the software manufacturer and are also potential entry points for
hacker intrusion. In U.S. v. Sullivan, 40 Fed. Appx. 740 (4th Cir. 2002), the court
of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction for intentionally damaging his former
employer's computer network by inserting a logic bomb thereby remotely disabling
the entire system.
45. Proponents of U.C.I.T.A. suggest that self-help can only be used for
"material" violations of the license. U.C.I.T.A. § 814 (2000). When coupled with
complete immunity for damages and losses caused by self-help, it is difficult to
believe that this self-help provision will not be openly abused.
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can engage in self-help by permitting the software to terminate unless
passwords are entered to reset the internal program clock or usage
counter so that the software can continue to be used. If the
consumer-user fails to comply with the demands of the
manufacturer then the software timer expires and the software
ceases to function. Any real or perceived violation of the license
terms could result in remotely triggered termination. Self-help
mechanisms are also used in data software which issues updated
versions. Unsolicited termination of the software in order to force
the consumer to purchase an updated version highlights the need to
restrict, not promote, the use of software self-help programs.
Proponents of U.C.I.T.A. label these latent intentional defects
as "restraints," thus trivializing the severity of this unilaterally
invoked sellers remedy. It should be recalled that U.C.I.T.A.
immunizes the manufacturer-assembler-vendor from any liability in
the event damage or loss is suffered by the purchaser-user of the
software.46 While there are minor limitations47 on the use of the
self-help provisions, these limitations are very weak in comparison41
to the power the licensor is wields under U.C.I.T.A. U.C.I.T.A.
would force consumers-users to sue for temporary restraining orders
and other injunctive relief, thereby shifting the burden of proof and
expense to the purchaser of the software, as opposed to forcing the
manufacturer-assembler-vendor to initiate copyright and license
infringement actions.49 It seems to be better public policy to force
the party who alleges a breach to bring an action and prove that
breach than to force a consumer to file a suit to enjoin a
manufacturer-assembler-vendor from remotely terminating the use
of the software. U.C.I.T.A. thus incorporates a presumption that the
46. Craig Dolly, The Electronic Self-Help Provisions of U C.I. T.A.: A Virtual
Repo Man?, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 663 (2000); Sharon M. Roberts & Cern Kaner,
Self-Help Under UC.I.TA., Paper presented at National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Annual Meeting (July 23, 1999), available
at http://www.badsoftware.com/shelp.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2003).
47. U.C.I.T.A. § 816 (2000).
48. Compare other self-help mechanisms, like the credit billing, credit reporting
and debt collection processes. Alleged protections to stem abuse of the power
structure favoring the the creditors, credit reporting agencies and debt collectors
have been proven to be very limited and interpreted against the consumer. Cf
Consumer Credit Reporting Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666, 1681, and 1692
(1998) and the cases reported under those statutes. The Federal Trade Commission
studies and actions have shown that when an industry is afforded self-help and
similar powers, those powers are frequently abused despite efforts to provide
notice-based protections to the consumer. Consumers are ill-equipped to combat
abuses and litigation to correct abuses have little effect to promote compliance.
49. U.C.I.T.A. is actually an effort to displace federal copyright law and to




licensee is in breach and is forced to sue to recover the use of the
purchased software.
The inclusion of licensed computer software in various, common
types of computer and software driven devices could open U.C.I.T.A.
sanctioned software self-help to sellers and lenders of these computer
and software driven devices.5 Some software vendors and lenders
have already begun to embed termination programs5 in the software
used in the automobiles that they sell. 2 If the consumer fails to pay
timely or if the lender thinks the consumer fails to meet some term of
the agreement, then the auto may be remotely disabled. As autos are
bought, sold and moved into Louisiana, the potential for self-help
programs being used in Louisiana raises considerable legal concern
because Louisiana does not permit extra-judicial self-help. 3 In the
event of a default on a car loan initiated outside of Louisiana, a lender
50. These will likely include all forms of financed sales and leases ofmovables.
51. Generally, these take the form of Time Bombs, Drop Dead Devices,
Disabling Devices, Termination Programs, and Stop Devices.
52. Am. Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F. Supp.
1473 (D. Minn. 1991) aff'd, Am. Computer Trust Leasing v. Boerboom Int'l, Inc.,
967 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding the use of electronic deactivation upon
licensee's default); North Texas Preventive Imaging, L.L.C. v. Harvey Eisenberg,
No. SA-CV-96-71 AHS, 1996 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 19990 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Gomar
Mfg. Co. v. Novelli, No. 96-4000, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23452 (D. N.J. Apr. 13,
1998); Frank & Sons, Inc. v. Information Solutions, No. 88-C-1474-E, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19356 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 1988). See also Paul Goodman, Time
Bombs, Stop Devices, and Other Stuff.- What Are the Legalities of Such Code?,
MacTech, available at http://www.mactech.com/articles/mactech/Vol.09/09.10/
TimeBomb/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003); Mary Jo Dively, Memorandum
on Reported Cases on Electronic Self-Help, The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact memo/uniformacts-memo-ucita.asp (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003); U.C.I.T.A. § 816 (2000); Art Stone Theatrical Corp. v.
Tech. Prog. & Sys. Support, 157 A.2d 689 (N.Y. 1990); Werner, Zaroll, Slotnick,
Stem & Askenazz v. Lewis, 155 Misc. 2d 558 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1992); Clayton X-
Ray Co. v. Prof. Sys. Corp., 812 S.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. Mo. W.D. 1991); Shaw v.
Toshiba America Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. Tex. 1999); In re
America Online, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
53. Price v. U-Haul Co. of S. La., 745 So. 2d 593, 599 (La. 1999) (Louisiana's
civilian heritage includes "principles of the abhorrence of self-help by creditors.");
Richard v. Broussard, 495 So. 2d 1291, 1293 (La. 1986); Chrysler Fin. Co. v.
Cloutier, 785 So. 2d 255, 258 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2001); Louisiana Materials Co. v.
Cronvich, 236 So. 2d 510, 517 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) (no self-help "even where
the rights are clear"); U-Haul Co. of S. La. v. Lumzy, 405 So. 2d 1099 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1981); Secor Bank v. Hackle, 644 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
For two cases involving methods of self-help dispossession (blocking rights of
way), see Atkins v. Johnson, 535 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988) and Wilfair
Assoc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 572 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990). See
also Bruce V. Schewe, Civilian Thoughts on UC.C. Section 9-503 Self-Help
Repossession: Reasoning in a Historical Vacuum, 42 La. L. Rev. 239 (1981).
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who elects to initiate remote deactivation of the software might do so
unaware that the device is located in Louisiana.
Remote termination of the software may likewise endanger
persons utilizing the software, leading to personal injury liability in
addition to data and business interruption damages which are also
likely to occur. It is easy to envision the use of this feature to
incapacitate an auto under U.C.I.T.A.'s self-help provisions. If that
auto were in use at the time, termination could result in danger to the
passengers as well as other persons and property on and along the
roadways. One might also expect a number of accidental
terminations due to accounting errors, mis-posted payments, wrongful
allegations of license breach, defects in the termination programs, and
other reasonably expected unjustified or otherwise wrongful
interruptions.54
XIV. LEADING CASES
The first case to address shrink-wrap licenses was a Louisiana
action. In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Limited,55 the court found
that a shrink-wrap license agreement was contrary to federal
copyright policy and constituted an impermissible contract of
adhesion under Louisiana law. The terms of the shrink-wrap license
were not valid or enforceable. In fact, prior to the action, the
Louisiana Legislature passed a law validating the use of shrink-wrap
license agreements.56
The next case was Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology, 7 where the court of appeals held that the shrink-wrap (box
top) license terms that excluded warranties and limited remedies
available to the software purchaser were in violation of U.C.C. Section
2-207. These exclusions were contained in the shrink-wrap license
terms which had not been previously disclosed to the buyer or reseller
of the software. The terms were added after the sale transaction was
completed. The court found that the disclaimers were an attempt to
make material alterations to the pre-existing agreement between the
parties. The court invalidated the shrink-wrap license.
Following Step-Saver, the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona faced a similar shrink-wrap issue in Arizona Retail
54. Louisiana law evidences a strong public policy against self-help activities
as such activities tend to lead to unnecessary and wrongful damages to Louisiana
residents. Price, 745 So. 2d 593.
55. 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987) aff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
56. La. Software License Enforcement Act, La. R.S. § 51:1961-66 (1987). See
also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
57. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 63
DA VID A. SZ WAK
Systems, Inc. v. Software Link Inc. 5' The court upheld a shrink-wrap
license agreement and liability limitation provisions contained therein,
with respect to one sale to a reseller but only because the reseller had
a copy of the license before the reseller agreed to purchase the product.
Nonetheless, the reseller sold the product to consumers and end users
who never saw the shrink-wrap license agreement and its liability
limitation provisions before the product was delivered post-sale and
post-payment. Of course, the court found that the shrink-wrap license
agreement and liability limitation provisions were enforceable against
the reseller but not enforceable against the consumers-end users
because they were an attempt to add terms in violation of Section 2-207
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
In Morgan Laboratories, Inc. v. Micro Data Base Systems,59 the
court refused to enforce a shrink wrap license's forum selection clause.
The court found that the contract between the parties required any
modifications to be made in writing. The court found that there was no
evidence that the original user license contained the forum selection
clause. Defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue was denied.
Citing Arizona Retail Systems v. Software Link, Inc.,'o the court noted
that U.C.C. section 2-209 requires assent to proposed modifications to
be express and not inferred merely from a party's conduct in continuing
with the agreement.
The first case to favor the enforceability of shrink-wrap
agreements was ProCD v. Zeidenberg,6' where the vendor, ProCD,
was the developer of a telephone number, name look-up and reverse
look-up software product. This was a retail product made available
to the mass market. The shrink-wrap license limited the use of the
product to non-commercial purposes. 2 Defendant extracted the data
and made it available on a publicly accessible web site. The District
Court held that the shrink-wrap terms were invalid and
unenforceable.63 The Court noted that the terms were preempted by
the federal copyright law. The court noted that the purchaser had not
58. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
59. No. C-96-3988 THE, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1193 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21,
1997).
60. Arizona Retail Sys., 939 F.2d 91.
61. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
62. InU.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1205-06 (D. Kan.
1998), the Court found that a single use restriction contained on the product
packaging was not a binding agreement and was invalid. The Court found that the
sales contract concluded when the vendor received the consumer orders. The single
use language on the product label was nothing more than a proposed modification
under U.C.C. § 2-209 which required the express assent of the consumer-buyer.
This finding was consistent with Step-Saver, 939 F.2d 91.
63. 908 F. Supp. 640, 655 (W.D. Wis. 1996), revd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996).
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seen the terms prior to purchase and, therefore, did not have the
ability to bargain or object to the terms or to even review them before
the purchase and payment were made. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed based upon policy reasoning, not controlling
precedent."
Courts have also begun to consider click-wrap license terms.
Click-wrap terms are the electronic version of shrink-wrap terms that
require the purchaser to assent by "mouse clicking" an "I agree" or
similar window button before the underlying software package will
install or operate. Plainly, click-wrap processes differ from shrink-
wrap.
In MA. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp.,65 the court
enforced a limitation on consequential damages found in a shrink-
wrap agreement which accompanied the software as delivered by the
reseller. This was a non-consumer case involving a contractor that
submitted a bid off by $2 million due to a software error. The court
found that the shrink-wrap license had been opened by the
contractor's employees who tried to install the software and who
ignored the license terms. The conspicuous license set forth a number
of disclaimers and offered to the purchaser the right to reject the new
terms in the license and to return the product for a "full refund" if the
new terms were unacceptable. Use of the software constituted
acknowledgment of and assent to those new license terms. The court
found that Mortenson knew about the various terms in the shrink-
wrap license because they had other similar software. In fact, the
subject software was an updated version. The Court cited and relied
upon ProCD and Hill v. Gateway 200066 in finding that shrink-wrap
licenses are generally enforceable.67 The court also rejected
Mortenson's defense based on U.C.C. 2-207, commonly referred to
as the "battle of the forms." The court distinguished Step-Saver
finding that the facts in Mortenson did not fit the provision. Lastly,
the court found that the limitation of liability clause was not
substantively or procedurally unconscionable. The court found the
clause to be a mere risk allocation for latent defects in the software.
64. ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447.
65. 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. App. Div. 1), cert. granted, 984 P.2d 1033 (Wash.
App. 1999), aff'd, 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
66. 105F.3d 1147 (7thCir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808,118 S. Ct.47(1997).
67. Of course, U.C.I.T.A. and decisions enforcing its concepts have come
under continual fire by commentators. See, e.g., Batya Goodman, Honey, IShrink-
Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink- Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21
Cardozo L. Rev. 319,344-52; Thomas J. McCarthy, Survey: Uniform Commercial
Code, 53 Bus. L. 1461, 1465-66; Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to
Imposing Unfair Arbitration on Consumers, 71 Fla. B.J. 8, 10-12 (Nov. 1997).
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In I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp.,6" the court
considered whether a click wrap agreement would be enforceable
under the Uniform Commercial Code. The court found that the
computer company confronted the click wrap license agreement in a
window box and was asked whether it agreed to the license. The
license page required the user (computer company in this case) to
mouse click on the "I Agree" box to proceed. The court found
unequivocal assent to the terms of the license. The court thus found
the click wrap license to be enforceable.
In Register. Corn, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,69 the court held that the user
of an internet domain name database had manifested its assent to the
database terms and license, which were prominently displayed, when
the user electronically submitted queries to the database after
acknowledging the terms. The court also enforced a license
agreement in Moore v. Microsoft Corp.,7° finding adequate proof of
assent, where the user was presented with a computer screen
prominently displaying the license terms and requiring the user to
click on a box marked "I Agree" before being allowed to proceed to
use the software.
In Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc.," the court enforced a forum
selection clause in an online contract for registering internet domain
names. The domain name site required the users to scroll through the
terms and conditions before indicating an acceptance or rejection of
the terms and conditions. Other courts have likewise enforced
licenses where the terms are prominently displayed and clearly
accepted by the user through active assent.' Courts finding a lack of
assent involved disguised terms and sites obscuring the terms."
In Groff v. America Online, Inc.," and Caspi v. The Microsoft
Network, LLC,75 the courts enforced forum selection terms in a click-
wrap license between an internet service provider and their
subscriber. In the wake of these decisions, there has been a rapid
growth in the use of click-wrap license terms. The click-wrap
licenses are particularly troubling when used after download of
software is completed or payment is already made, prior to the
68. 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002).
69. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
70. 293 A.D.2d 587 (N.Y. App. 2d Dept. 2002).
71. 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001).
72. See also America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (upholding forum selection clause in "freely negotiated agreement" in
online license).
73. See, e.g., Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000)(license terms in small, gray text on a gray background on a linked web page
created obscured presentation).
74. 1998 WL 307001 (RI. Sup. Ct. 1998).
75. 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
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disclosure of the terms. Again, there is no advance disclosure of the
terms and no opportunity to reject or negotiate the terms, reject the
software, or reject the sale and reverse the payment transfer to the
licensor.
Mandatory arbitration clauses buried in shrink-wrap or click-
wrap or other online acceptance means have also been the subject
of litigation. In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,76 Lieschke v.
RealNetworks, Inc., 7 Simon v. RealNetworks, Inc. ,78 and Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc.," the courts enforced mandatory arbitration
clauses in click-wrap and shrink-wrap license terms involving the
sale of computer hardware that included software products.
Recently, in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,S° plaintiffs,
computer users and web site provider, sued defendants, software
vendor and its parent company, alleging violations of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants provided free software to
download and then defendants were able to cause the user's
computers to transfer very private information to defendants while
that software was in use. Defendants failed to advise the plaintiffs
of this deceptive, high-tech invasion of privacy. The court in Specht
denied defendants' motion to compel arbitration. Defendants
claimed that a license agreement contained in the software
downloaded provided for arbitration. The court found that the
download process occurred without any act to assure that the
consumers manifested assent to the terms of the license and without
any indication that the consumer understood that an alleged
"contract" was being formed. The Court noted that unlike some
shrink-wrap and click-wrap cases, the user was not made aware that
he/she was entering into any alleged contract at all.
Only one court has enforced an extremely restrictive subscriber
license term between an e-mail service provider and a subscriber
prohibiting the subscriber's transmission of unsolicited e-mail.
While the court did not pass on the issue of whether the click-wrap
subscriber terms were enforceable, the court did ultimately enter a
preliminary injunction against the subscriber.
76. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
77. No. 99-C-7274, 99-C-7380, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683, 2000 WL
198424 (N.D. I11. Feb. 10, 2000).
78. Id. Editor's Note-Simon v. RealNetworks, Inc. was consolidated with
Lieschke, and is found at the same citation.
79. 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
80. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aft'd, 306 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 2002).
81. Hotmail Corp. v. Vans Money Pie, Inc., No. C98-20064 JW & C98 JW
PVT ENE, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998).
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More recently, in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,82 the plaintiff sued a
scanner manufacturer and vendor because of malfunctions in the
scanner after the sale. The court found that the manufacturer failed
to produce evidence proving that the plaintiff agreed to an arbitration
clause contained in a shrink-wrap license. The manufacturer had
mailed the license terms, including the arbitration clause, to the
consumer inside the computer box for plaintiff s later perusal. These
terms were not available or even made known to the consumer prior
to receipt of the box. Citing Step-Saver, the court found that the
parties' conduct evidenced a contract for the sale of a computer, the
subject of Article 2 of the U.C.C. The Klocek court rejected Hill's
and ProCD's conclusion that the "vendor is the master of the offer"
because there was no support for that conclusion under the applicable
Kansas or Missouri law, concluding instead that U.C.C. section 2-204
was applicable. The Klocek court found that in consumer cases, the
purchaser-consumer is the offeror and the vendor is the offeree.83 The
court went on to find that no conditional sale took place because
Gateway never conditioned the sale on the non-disclosed additional
terms in the shrink-wrapped package. The court found that the
vendor must clearly disclose all of the terms at the time of the sale or,
at a minimum, advise the consumer that additional terms exist and
make the sale conditional."
Other jurisdictions have elected to follow Hill and ProCD. In
Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp.,85 the court enforced a warranty disclaimer
shrink-wrapped inside the computer "zip" drive packaging. In
Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 6 and Levy v. Gateway 2000,
Inc. ,87 the courts upheld an arbitration clause contained in shrink-
wrapped license terms mailed inside the computer box to the
consumer.
XV. LOUISIANA'S SOFTWARE LICENSE ENFORCEMENT ACT88
Louisiana enacted the Software License Enforcement Act
designed to legitimize shrink wrap licenses in computer software and
circumvent the law of sales in Louisiana. In Louisiana Revised
Statute 51:1963, the act provides that any person who acquires
82. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
83. Id. at 1340 (citing with approval Brown Mach., Div. of John Brown, Inc.
v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo.App. 1989)); Rich Products Corp. v.
Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 956 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
84. 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341 n.4.
85. No. 98C-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 1999).
86. No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000).
87. 1997 WL 823611 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 12, 1997).
88. La. R.S. 51:1961-66 (1987).
2002]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
computer software is "conclusively deemed" to have accepted and
agreed to all terms of the license agreement for the software if a
notice is "affixed to, or packaged with the software" in a manner so
that the notice is "clearly and conspicuously visible upon cursory
examination of the software and related packaging." It is further
required that the notice be in "all capital letters" and in "language
which is readily understandable to a person of average literacy." The
notice must "clearly state" that use of the software constitutes
acceptance of the terms of the license. The section proceeds to permit
"[A]ny opening of a sealed package... in which the software or a
copy thereof is contained will constitute acceptance of the terms of
the accompanying license agreement."89 Section 1963 also provides
that anyone who receives the software or a copy of the software but
who does not accept and agree to the terms of the license may return
the unused, unopened software or copy for a full refund." This
section of the Software License Enforcement Act permits non-
disclosed terms to be foisted upon the consumer post-sale, under the
guise of a license agreement.
Section 1964 of the act enumerates specific license provisions
"deemed to have been accepted under R.S. 51:1963" if the license
agreement conforms to the provisions of Revised Statute 51:1965.
Section 1964 permits title retention by the licensor of the software.
The licensor can prohibit copying of the software and impose
limitations upon use of the software.9' Section 1964 also permits
prohibition or restrictions on "translating, reverse engineering,
decompiling, disassembling, and/or creating derivative works based
on the computer software.'
Section 1965 of the act provides that in order for the software
acquirer to be deemed to have accepted the license terms, the license
agreement must be "clearly and conspicuously stated in the license
agreement in language readily understandable to the person of
average literacy."" Further, the statute provides that the license
agreement "must be attached to or packaged with the copy of the
computer software." The license agreement and terms must be
"susceptible to being readily examined before the act which is
deemed to constitute acceptance occurs. 94 This section reaffirms the
legislature's desire to allow sales to take place before the customer
learns of the license terms. The Software License Enforcement Act
raises more questions than it answers. Louisiana is one of only
89. La. R.S. 51:1963(3)(b) (1987).
90. La. R.S. 51:1963(4) (1987).
91. La. R.S. 51:1964(2) (1987).
92. La. R.S. 51:1964(3) (1987).




several states which have passed laws allowing software companies
to impose certain contractual terms upon purchasers through the use
of shrink wrap license agreements. Of course, in Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Limited, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Louisiana's Software License Enforcement Act is preempted
by federal copyright law and, therefore, unenforceable.
XVI. THE BEST SOLUTION: THE BOMB SHELTER PROVISION
Exactly what part of U.C.I.T.A. favors the consumer?96 None.
Some states have refused to pass this special interest legislation and
have begun enacting "bomb shelter" provisions to prevent the
application of U.C.I.T.A.97 Frequently, consumers encounter shrink-
wrap, click-wrap, keystroke, and mouse-click internet contractual
provisions calling for an agreement to use the law of a state favoring
and enacting U.C.I.T.A.
Though proponents have lobbied hard for states to pass
U.C.I.T.A., to date, only two states, Maryland and Virginia, have
passed versions of U.C.I.T.A.9" The legislation enacted by Maryland
incorporated a number of changes from the model being peddled by
the software industry. The Maryland legislature amended the model
version to remove some of the most controversial provisions.
Virginia, however, passed a version which is extremely similar to the
model act.
Arizona is currently considering a significantly altered version of
the model act.99 The City Council in the District of Columbia is
considering a U.C.I.T.A. bill introduced on March 27, 2001, which
has been referred to committee. Proponents suggested that U.C.I.T.A.
would be introduced in Florida and Georgia in 2001 but neither was
95. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
96. The same can be said for Louisiana's Software License Enforcement Act,
La. R.S. 51:1961-66 (1987).
97. State legislation might become moot if Congress decides to step in and
support and pass some version of U.C.I.T.A. Federal preemption can remove state
efforts to help under the guise of uniformity. Congress' track record of protecting
consumers is somewhat weak. Consider that most federal consumer protection laws
are lobbied for and favor the industry rather than the consumer. However, most
federal laws claiming to protect consumers are given deceptive names, for example,
Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Credit Billing Act, etc.
98. Virginia's version of U.C.I.T.A. became effective on July 1, 2000.
Maryland's version of U.C.I.T.A. became effective on October 1, 2000. For
commentary regarding Maryland's enactment, see Ed Foster, MarylandLegislature
Caves to UCITA, but Iowa May Offer a Safe Haven from Law, InfoWorld (Apr. 24,
2000), available at http://www.infoworld.com/articles/op/xmlOO/04/24/OOO424op
foster.xml (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
99. H.B. 2041, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2001).
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introduced. In Oklahoma, New Hampshire, °" Maine,01 and Illinois,
U.C.I.T.A. bills died after introduction. In Hawaii, U.C.I.T.A. was
introduced in 2000 and revisited in 2001 but was ultimately tabled
due to controversy. In Rhode Island, a U.C.I.T.A. bill was
withdrawn due to overwhelming opposition. Two U.C.I.T.A.
versions were introduced as bills in the Texas and New Jersey
Legislatures in 2001 but all of the bills died. °2 In 2001, U.C.I.T.A.
was introduced in special session in the State of Washington. The
Republican Caucus began efforts to pass U.C.I.T.A. as part of a
large economic development plan in Wisconsin. It is expected that
U.C.I.T.A. proponents will continue to try building alliances in the
hopes of slipping this legislation into law.
On the other side of the issue, Iowa lead the charge to protect its
residents and businesses by enacting a bomb shelter provision.'0 3
The provision exempted Iowa residents and businesses from the
effects of U.C.I.T.A. and specifically denies the application of
another state's law, pursuant to choice of law clause if any version
of U.C.I.T.A. is the chosen law of that state.'" The original
legislation, part of an Electronic Transaction Act proposal, passed
with a planned expiration date of July, 2001. Even after studying
U.C.I.T.A. in the interim, the Iowa Legislature renewed the bomb
shelter provision thereby continuing the protections until 2002.105
Iowa's legislation has been hailed as a valiant effort to protect its
citizens from the special interests of the software industry.'0 6
Following Iowa's lead, West Virginia 07 and North Carolina 8
passed bomb shelter provisions to protect their residents and
businesses from U.C.I.T.A.
100. S.B. 178, General Court, 2001 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2001).
101. LD 1324 (Me. 2001).
102. H.B. 1785, 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2001); S.B. 709, 77th Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2001); H.B. A3560, 2000-2001 Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2000); S.B. S1201, 2000-2001
Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2000).
103. H.F. 2205 § 4, 78th Gen. Assembly (Iowa 2001).
104. See 2000 Ia. Leg. Serv. H.F. 2205, Ia. St. § 554D.104.4.
105. H.F. 569 (formerly H.B. 386), 78th Gen. Assembly (Iowa 2001).
106. See, e.g., Jessica Davis, Anti-U. CI. TA. Sentiment Growing, InfoWorld
(Apr. 12, 2001), available at http://www.itworld.com/Man/2683/IWD010412hn
ucita/ (last visited Feb. 24,2003); Foster, U.C.. TA., supra note 10; Ed Foster, The
Gripe Line, InfoWorld (Apr. 24, 2000), available at http://www. infoworld.
com/articles/op/xmlI/00/04/24/000424opfoster.xml (citing that "[S]oftware industry
lobbyists are swarming into the state (Iowa) like angry mosquitoes.") (last visited
Feb. 24,2003); Chris McManes, U C.! TA. Stalls, Giving Opponents Hope, Today's
Engineer, IEEE (Sept.-Oct. 2001), available at http://www.
todaysengineer.org/policyperspectives/septOl/sept0lfeatures/UCITA.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2003).
107. S.B. 204, 2001 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2001).
108. S.L. 2001-295 (2001).
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Other states currently have bomb shelter provisions under
consideration. New York, ° North Dakota, " Ohio,"I and Oregon" 12
have such bills pending. Those bills follow the model bomb shelter
language employed by Iowa and West Virginia. Only North Dakota
considered a bomb shelter provision that was rejected by the
legislature." 3 Reintroduction is likely and its consideration is being
pressed by business leaders. Note that some states have proposed
amendments to please interest groups that oppose U.C.I.T.A." 4
One alternative would require the states and federal legislative
bodies to re-work many existing consumer laws to specifically make
them applicable to "licensees" and software "licenses." This would
be an enormous undertaking for the sole purpose of appeasing the
software industry. It would involve revising thousands of consumer
protection statutes, many of which interact with other statutes.
In closing, U.C.I.T.A. is an extreme measure being advanced by
the software industry in the hopes of enacting at least parts of it into
state law. The states should stand firm and reject the passage of
U.C.I.T.A. inspired legislation, and indeed, enact bomb shelter
provisions to prevent the application of foreign state's U.C.I.T.A.
derived statutes through "choice of law" provisions in software
licenses. Consumer protection should take precedence over the
special interests of an industry that will not play by the same rules
as other vendors of goods.
109. A07902, 2001 Assembly (N.Y. 2001). The New York Attorney General
approved this Bill, but the session ended without further action.
110. S.B. 2429, 57th Leg. Assembly (N.D. 2001). S.B. 2429 was defeated in
committee but is expected to be re-urged next session.
111, H.B. 287, 124th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 2001). Hearings are ongoing.
U.C.I.T.A. proponents have lobbied aggressively against H.B. 287 and have
claimed the bomb shelter is "unconstitutional." See http://www.ala.org/
washoff/ucita/0402flash.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
112. Oregon had two pending bills: H.B. 3077, 71st Leg. Assembly, Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2001) and H.B. 3230, 71st Leg. Assembly, Reg. Sess., (Or. 2001). Both bills
died but did prevent the passage of an opposing U.C.I.T.A. bill. A task force has
been assigned to study U.C.I.T.A. H.B. 3163, 71 st Leg. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Or.
2001).
113. S.B. 2429, 57th Leg. Assembly (N.D. 2001).
114. For example, the New Jersey Law Revision Commission proposed
exempting libraries, a major coalition opposing U.C.I.T.A., from the effects of
U.C.I.T.A. The New Jersey Law Revision Commission was charged with an
extensive study of U.C.I.T.A. and drafted an amendment to try to gain the support
of the library community which has been most vocal about the oppressive nature of
U.C.I.T.A. See http://www.4cite.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2003). "Divide and
conquer" seems to be the message from U.C.I.T.A. proponents.
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